Abstract-This paper presents a new approach to integrated security and dependability evaluation, which is based on stochastic modeling techniques. Our proposal aims to provide operational measures of the trustworthiness of a system, regardless if the underlying failure cause is intentional or not. By viewing system states as elements in a stochastic game, we can compute the probabilities of expected attacker behavior, and thereby be able to model attacks as transitions between system states. The proposed game model is based on a reward-and cost concept. A section of the paper is devoted to the demonstration of how the expected attacker behavior is affected by the parameters of the game. Our model opens up for use of traditional Markov analysis to make new types of probabilistic predictions for a system, such as its expected time to security failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a concept addressing the attributes confidentiality, integrity and availability [1] . Today it is widely accepted that, due to the unavoidable presence of vulnerabilities, design faults and administrative errors, an ICT system will never be totally secure. Connecting a system to a network will necessarily introduce a risk of inappropriate access resulting in disclosure, corruption and/or loss of information. Therefore, the security of a system should ideally be interpreted in a probabilistic manner. More specifically, there is an urgent need for modeling methods that provide operational measures of the security. Dependability, on the other hand, is the ability of a computer system to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted. It is a generic concept, which includes the attributes reliability, availability, safety, integrity and maintainability [2] . In a dependability context one distinguishes between accidental faults, which are modeled as random processes, and intentional faults, i.e. attacks, which in most cases are not considered at all. A major drawback of this approach is that attacks may in This paper is based on "Towards a Stochastic Model for Integrated Security and Dependability Evaluation", by K. Sallhammar many cases be the dominating failure cause for today's networked systems. The classical way of dependability evaluation can therefore be very deceptive; highly dependable systems may in reality fail much more frequently than expected, due to the exploitation from attackers.
To be considered trustworthy, a system must be both dependable and secure. However, these two aspects have so far tended to be treated separately. A unified modeling framework for security and dependability evaluation would be advantageous from both points of view. The security community can benefit from the mature dependability modeling techniques, which can provide the operational measures that are so desirable today. On the other hand, by adding hostile actions to the set of possible fault sources, the dependability community will be able to make more realistic models than the ones that are currently in use. In this paper we review a methodology that traditionally has been used for system dependability analysis only, and motivate the application of a similar approach in the security domain. By modeling intrusions alongside with accidental failures, both the security and dependability properties of a system can be considered during the evaluation process.
Modeling and analysis of a system for predictive purposes can be performed by static or dynamic methods. This paper focuses on the dynamic method of using stochastic models (Markov chains), which is commonly used to obtain availability (the fraction of time the system is operational during an observation period) or reliability (the probability that the system remains operational over an observation period) predictions by the dependability community. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the stochastic model and explains how intrusions can be modeled as transition between states in the model. Section III explains how the model can be used to predict measures for the system. In Section IV, we show that the states can be viewed as elements in a stochastic game, and explain how game theory can be used to compute the expected attacker behavior. Then, in Section V, we demonstrate how the expected attacker behavior is affected by the parameters of the game. To illustrate the approach, Section VI includes a small case study. In Section VII we compare our work with related research. Section VIII includes some concluding remarks and points to future work.
II. STOCHASTIC MODELING
At the highest level of a system description is the specification of the system's functionality. The security policy is normally a part of this specification. This high level description can be used to perform qualitative assessment of system properties, such as the security levels obtained by Common Criteria evaluation [3] . Even though a qualitative evaluation can be used to rank a particular security design, its main focus is on the safeguards introduced during the development and design of the system. Moreover, such methods only evaluate static behavior of the system and do not consider dependencies of events or time aspects of failures. As a consequence, the achieved security level cannot be used to predict the system's actual behavior, i.e. its ability to withstand attacks when running in a certain threat environment. To create a model suitable for quantitative analysis and assessment of operational security and dependability, one needs to use a fine-granular system description, which is capable of incorporating the dynamic behavior of the system. This is the main strength of state transition models where, at a low level, the system is modeled as a finite state machine. By a state in this context is meant an operational mode of the system characterized by which units of the system that are operational or failed, whether there are ongoing attacks, active countermeasures, operational and maintenance activities, whether parts of the system compromised or not, etc. Most systems consist of a set of interacting components and the system state is therefore the set of its component states. In a state transition model, one usually discriminates between good states and failed states, depending on whether the required service is delivered or not. Normally, a system will be subject to multiple failure cases, so that the model will have multiple failure modes. During its operational lifetime, a system will alternate between its different states. This may be due to normal usage as well as misuse, administrative measures and maintenance, as well as software-and hardware failures and repairs. The behavior of the system is therefore characterized by the transitions between the states, each transition triggered by an event. The event that will occur next, as well as the time until next event, is random. Hence, the behavior of the system is a stochastic process.
A. The Failure Process
It has been shown in [2] , [4] , [5] that the "faulterror-failure" pathology, which is commonly used for modeling the failure process in a dependability context, can be applied in the security domain as well. Based on the results from this research we demonstrate how a stochastic process can be used to model security failures in a similar way as the dependability community usually treats accidental and unintentional failures.
By definition, the fault-error-failure process is a sequence of events. A fault is an atomic phenomenon, that can be either internal or external, which causes an error in the system. An error is a deviation from the correct operation of the system. An error is always internal and will not be visible from outside the system. Even though a system is erroneous it still manages to deliver its intended services. An error may lead to a failure of the system. In a dependability context, a failure is an event that causes the delivered service to deviate from the correct service, as described in the system's functional specification. Similarly, a security failure causes a system service to deviate from its security requirements, as specified in the security policy. For each failure state, which conflicts with the system's intended functionality, we can therefore assign a corresponding property that is violated, e.g. confidentiality-failed or availability-failed. Both securityand dependability failures can be caused by a number of accidental fault sources, such as erroneous user input, administrative misconfiguration, software bugs, hardware deterioration, etc. The failures originating from most of these faults can be modeled as randomly distributed in time, as is common practice in dependability modeling and analysis. However, the ones hardest to predict are the external malicious human-made faults, which are introduced with the objective of altering the functioning of the system during use [2] . In a security context, the result of such a fault is generally referred to as an intrusion. Because they are intentional in nature, intrusions cannot be modeled as truly random processes. Even though the time, or effort, to perform an intrusion may be randomly distributed, the decision to perform the action is not. As pointed out in [6] , security analysis must assume that an attacker's choice of action will depend on the system state, may change over time, and will result in security failures that are highly correlated.
B. Modeling Intrusion as Transitions
To be able to model the effect of an intrusion as a transition between a good system state and a failed system state, one needs to take a closer look at the intrusion process itself. According to [4] , there are two underlying causes of any intrusion:
• At least one vulnerability, i.e. weakness, in the system. The vulnerability is possible to exploit, however, it will require a certain amount of time from an attacker.
• A malicious action that tries to exploit the vulnerability. Since the action is intentional, a decision is implicitly made by the attacker. All attackers will not choose the same course of action. Hence, there will be a probability that an attacker decides to perform a particular action.
An intrusion will therefore result from an action which has been successful in exploiting a vulnerability. Assume that i is a good (but vulnerable) system state and that j is a failed system state. To formalize the idea of an attacker's decision, we define π i (a) as the probability that an attacker will choose action a when the system is in state i. In a low level system abstraction model, the successful intrusion will cause a transition of the system state, from the good state i to the failed state j. In this paper we model all the expected failure times as negatively exponentially distributed. This is primarily to simplify mathematical analysis of the system. In reality, other types of distributions may be more suitable. Define λ ij (a) as the accumulated failure intensity if all potential attackers always take action a. Hence, the failure rate between state i and j may be computed as q ij = π i (a)λ ij (a). This is illustrated in Fig. 1 where the good state i = 1 is depicted as a circle and the failed state j = 2 as a square. By introducing the attack probability π i (a), the result from a successful intrusion can be modeled as one or more intentional state changes of the underlying stochastic process, which represents the dynamic behavior of the system. The adopted method for computing the attack probabilities will be explained in Section IV.
In contrast to attack graphs, as used in e.g. [7] , where each state transition corresponds to a single atomic step of a penetration, our model aims to be more high-level and focus on the impact of the intrusions on the system rather than on the specific attack procedures themselves. This facilitates the modeling of unknown attacks in terms of generic state transitions. For example, in the stochastic model depicted in Fig. 1 the attack a can simply be explained as "the action that seeks to transfer the system from the good state 1 to the failed state 2".
During the modeling process, the granulation of the state space needs to be carefully considered. Too simple models (as the one in Fig. 1 ) will not provide any valuable insight into the system behavior, whereas too complex models may quickly lead to state space explosion. The choice of what to include in the states definition will therefore be a trade-off between model representativeness and complexity. An example, primary for illustration purposes, will be provided in Section VI.
III. OBTAINING SYSTEM MEASURES
This section formalizes the ideas discussed in the precious section, and explains how the stochastic model can be used to predict system security and dependability measures.
A. System Equations
In mathematical terms, the stochastic process describing the dynamic system behavior is a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) with discrete state space S = {S 1 , . . . , S N }. Let
where X i (t) denotes the probability that the system is in state i at time t. Formally, the interactions between the states i = 1, . . . , N are described in the N × N statetransition rate matrix Q, whose elements are
The element q ij ∈ Q, (i = j), represents the transition rate between state i and j in the model and is, if the transition is caused by an intrusion, constructed from an attack probability and intensity, as explained in Section II-B. If the initial state of the system, i.e. X(0), is known, the state equation can be solved. Then
The solution to this equation provides the transient state probabilities for a system. However, it is common to assume that the system is in steady state when analyzed. The probability that a CTMC will be in state i at time t often converges to a limiting value, which is independent of the initial state. The steady state probabilities
where
. . , N , can then be obtained by solving the set of N equations given by N −1 of the N equations
and with the N 'th equation
The steady state probabilities provide us with the possibility of obtaining operational measures of the system, such as the mean between failures (M T BF ) or the mean time spent in the good states (M U T ). See e.g. [8] for details. To compute the mean time to failure (M T T F ) and the mean time to first failure (M T F F ) for a system we adopt the approach described in [9] . Assume that the state set can be partitioned as S = {S G , S F }, where S G = {S 1 , . . . , S K } and S F = {S K+1 , . . . , S N }, so that the states 1, . . . , K are good states and the states K + 1, . . . , N are failed states. Since the state set S is ordered, the Q matrix can be written i partitioned form as
where the size of Q 1 is K ×K, the size of Q 2 is K ×(N − K) and so forth. To compute the M T F F one assumes that the system is new at t = 0, i.e. the initial state is known by certainty, and it is known to be good. Define
the mean time to first failure for the system can be computed as
To compute the M T T F the steady state probabilities in (4) must be known. Since S is partitioned, also X can be partitioned as X = {X G , X F }, where X G = {X 1 , . . . , X K } and X F = {X K+1 , . . . , X N }. Now the system can be in any of the good states at t = 0, i.e.
where h K is a column vector of K ones.
B. Model Parameterization
In order to obtain measures the stochastic model has to be parameterized, i.e. the elements q ij ∈ Q need to be evaluated. The procedure of obtaining accidental failureand repair rates has been practiced for many years in traditional dependability analysis, and will therefore not be discussed in this paper. However, choosing the accumulated attack intensities λ ij (a)'s remains a challenge. One solution is to let security experts assess the intensities based on subjective expert opinion, empirical data or a combination of both. An example of empirical data is historical attack data collected from honeypots. The data can also be based on intrusion experiments performed by, for example, students in a controlled environment. Empirical data from such an experiment conducted at Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden [10] indicates that the time between successful intrusions during the standard attack phase is exponentially distributed. Another ongoing project at the Carnegie Mellon CyLab [11] aims to collect information from a number of different sources in order to predict attacks. Even though the process of assessing the attack intensities is crucial, and an important research topic in itself, it is not the primary focus of this paper.
Obtaining realistic π i (a)'s, i.e. the probabilities that an attacker chooses particular attack actions in certain system states, may be more difficult. In this paper we use game theory as a means for computing the expected attacker behavior. The procedure is summarized in the next section.
IV. PREDICTING ATTACKER BEHAVIOR
Game theory is an approach frequently used for human behavior prediction in e.g. economics, political science and sociology. This section demonstrates how a twoplayer zero-sum stochastic game [12] can be used to compute the expected attacker behavior, in terms of a set of attack probability vectors π = {π i }. The procedure contains five main steps: 1) Identify the game elements.
2) Construct the action sets. In the context of attack prediction for security and dependability assessment, the game is played by an attacker versus the system 1 . Even though in real-life there may be numerous attackers attacking the system, simultaneously and independent of each other, a two-player game model is sufficient to predict their individual behavior, provided that they possess similar motives and skills. In contrast to previous research in the field of network security and game theory (see Section VII) we view the game entirely from an attacker's perspective. The purpose of our game model is to predict the behavior of attackers and not to perform any cost-benefit optimization of system defense strategies. We therefore assume that the set of system IDS mechanisms are fixed and do not change over time. Since the game is zero-sum, one player's gain will be the other player's loss. Hence, we do not need to specify separate outcome values for the system itself, as was done in [13] and [14] , it is sufficient to assign the attackers' outcome values. The main benefit of our approach is that it does not assume that the attackers know the system outcome values. Moreover, it reduces the number of parameters in the system evaluation model that has to be assessed.
To compute the expected attacker behavior by means of a stochastic game, the five-step procedure is as follows.
A. Step 1: Identify the Game Elements.
The first step is to identify the game elements. From the stochastic model, pick all states in S where the system is vulnerable to intrusions. Each of these states can be viewed as a game element Γ i in a two-player zero-sum stochastic game with state set Γ. For example, in Fig. 2 the shaded states V , L and IS represent states where the system is vulnerable. Hence, the set of game elements for this model is Note that even though the system state space S may be very large, the corresponding set with game elements Γ will (in most cases) contain only a subset of all the states in S, as the example indicates.
B.
Step 2: Construct the Action Sets.
The next step is to construct the action sets A and D. The set A consists of all possible attack actions. For all transitions out of the game element states, which represent intrusions, identify the corresponding attack actions. Note that A must also contain an "inaction", which we will denote by φ, to represent that an attacker may not take any action at all. We use A i = {a 1 , . . . , a m } to refer to the set of actions available in game state i. All actions will not necessarily be available in all states, i.e. A i ⊆ A, however A i ∩ φ = φ. For instance, in Fig. 2 the complete action set is A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , φ}, whereof A V = {a 1 , φ}, A L = {a 2 , a 3 , φ} and A IS = {a 3 , φ}.
Let π i be the probability distribution over the action set A i . In a game theoretic context
Hence, π i (a k ) ∈ π i will be the probability that an attacker chooses action a k when the system is in state i, as previously discussed. One must have
The attack probability vectors π i will represent the degree of hostility in the network environment, or equivalently, the aggressiveness of the attackers targeting the system. The smaller π i (a k ), the less the probability of the particular attack a k in system state i and, hence, the smaller the corresponding failure rate will be.
The set D consists of all possible defense actions,
is the probability that an IDS alarm indicating action a k will be triggered in system state i. As for A i , also D i must contain an φ element, since there may not be any reaction at all from the system. Also
Step 3: Assign the Outcome Values.
To model the attackers' motivation we make use of a reward-and cost concept. The term cost is used to refer to a negative reward. By an outcome of a game element is meant a possible consequence of a play of the game, as experienced by an attacker. For each game element Γ i , we assign an outcome value to each attack action and response pair (a k , d l ) . These values will be denoted r kl , or c kl , depending on whether the outcome represents a reward or cost. The possible outcomes from game element Γ V in Fig. 2 is depicted in Fig. 3 . Since an attacker has two actions to choose between, A V = {a 1 , φ}, and there are two possible response actions, D V = {d 1 , φ}, there are four possible outcomes from that particular play. It could be argued that since nothing happens if the attacker does not take any action, the outcomes from the action pairs (φ, d 1 ) and (φ, φ) do not make any sense from an attacker's point of view. We counter this by pointing out that what we aim to compute from Γ V is the expected attacker behavior in terms of strategy π V = (π V (a 1 ), π V (φ)), which an attacker decides to adopt before the attack. So, if we assign a reward to the action pair (φ, d 1 ) it implies that if the attacker decides not to attack the system, no matter what, and that all the attacks will always be detected, then the attacker will experience this outcome as a gain: "It's good that I didn't try to attack the system, since I would have been detected if I did". This will be the case even though the system never gets a chance to actually detect any attack. The same line of reasoning is valid for the (φ, φ) outcome.
Reward and cost are generic concepts, which can be used to quantify the payoff of the actions both in terms of abstract values, such as social status and satisfaction versus disrespect and disappointment, as well as real values such as financial gain and loss. For instance, in [13] the reward of a successful attack action is the expected amount of recovery effort required from the system administrator and in [15] the reward is the degree of bandwidth occupied by a DDoS attack. In contrast to [13] , [15] , we use the cost values in the game model to represent the fact that risk averse attackers may sometimes refrain from certain attack actions due to the possible consequences of detection. Note that the outcome values themselves are not important, it is their size relatively to each other that will affect the expected attacker behavior. This topic will be further discussed in Section V.
D. Step 4: Compute the Transition Probabilities.
Given that an attack action is chosen in state i, and that the intrusion is successful and remains undetected, the system may transfer to another state j where the game can continue. The transition probability between game element Γ i and Γ j , denoted p ij (a k , d l ), can be computed by conditioning on the chosen action a k and the system response d l . For example, if the system in Fig. 2 is in state V and an attacker decides to attack the system, and the action remains undetected, then π V a 1 |(a 1 , φ) = 1. It is obtained from the Markov properties of the system that the probability of going from state V to L becomes
Here, ϕ V G , µ S and µ H are the rates of the competing events, which may disturb the attack. Hence, (11) is the probability that the game will continue in state L. Note that one must have p ij (a k , d l ) ≥ 0 and
Recall that A i and D i are the action sets associated with state i. The possible outcomes of each game element Γ i can now be represented by a |A i | × |D i | matrix, which has the form
where γ kl is the total outcome associated with the action pair (a k , d l ). The entries in (12) , representing state i, are of the form
for which r kl ≥ 0 and c kl ≤ 0. When solving the game, the Γ j element in (13) will be replaced by a value, as explained in the next subsection. The first case in (13) applies if the outcome represents a successful and undetected attack action. The attacker receives an immediate reward r kl and there is also a possibility of future rewards, since the system may move to another game state. The second case normally applies if an attack action is detected, but can also apply if an attacker resigns even though any of the possible attacks would have been undetected. The attacker receives a cost c kl . Implicitly, the formulation in (13) means that the game will end if an attack is detected and reacted to, if the attacker resigns, or if the system does not transfer to another game state, which will happen with probability 1 − j p ij (a k , d l ).
E.
Step 5: Solve the Game.
The last step is to solve the game. By solving is meant to compute the best strategies for the players who participate in the game. Our model relies on the basic assumption of game theory, which states that a rational player will always try to maximize his own reward. For each system state i, which is modeled as a game element Γ i , we can therefore expect an attacker to behave in accordance with the probability distribution
Recall that we use zero-sum game elements to model the interactions between an attacker and the system. An attacker who does not know the defense strategy θ i will therefore think of the system as a counter-player in the game who tries to minimize the attacker's reward. Hence, the optimal attack strategy of Γ i , and its corresponding defense strategy, are obtained by solving
These strategies will be denoted π * i and θ * i , respectively. The value of game element Γ i , denoted V (i), is defined as the expected outcome when π * i and θ * i are used, i.e.
The purpose of the stochastic game model is to predict the complete set of attack probability vectors π * = {π * i } to be used in the system rate matrix Q. To find the π * i strategies for all game elements in the stochastic game, one can use Alg. 1, which is based on the Shapley algorithm [16] . The functions Value[Γ i ] and Solve[Γ i ] refer to standard algorithms for solving zero-sum matrix games by linear programming. The former returns the expected value in (16) when the attacker and the system use their optimal strategies, whereas the latter returns the attacker's optimal strategy itself as resulting from (15) . Note that Alg. 1 replaces the game element Γ j in (13) with its value component V (j) iteratively when solving the stochastic game.
Algorithm 1 Compute expected attacker strategy
Require: (Γ, A, D, γ, p) {a stochastic game} Ensure: π * {the optimal attack strategy} Initialize the value vector V = {V (i)} arbitrarily repeat for each game element Γ i ∈ Γ do for all γ kl do replace all Γ j in (13) with V (j) end for compute the matrix
We believe that the optimal attack strategy set π * = {π * i } will be a good indication of the expected attack probabilities for the vulnerable system states. This is because π * gives a lower-bound on the attacker outcome, regardless of the system defense strategy. When following π * the attacker has no reason to change strategy; the noregrets property of game theory. This property means that the attacker has maximized his expected outcome from the attack, regardless if his actions are successful or not. Several experienced indicates that this search for guarantees is a very strong motivation of human behavior. Assuming that the attacker population targeting the system will make rational choices relative to their objectives, their collected behavior will, in the long run, gravitate towards the optimal attack strategy [17] . For further details on the underlying assumptions and solution of the stochastic game model, the reader is referred to [12, pp. 96-101].
V. ATTACKER PROFILING To distinguish between different types of attackers, it is common practice to make use of attacker profiles. A number of fine-granular classifications of attackers exist in the literature. In [18] Rogers summarizes earlier research on attacker categorization and provides a new taxonomy based on a two-dimensional circumflex classification model. Skill and motivation are identified as the primary classification criteria, which fit well into our mathematical framework where the attacker skill is represented by attack intensities and the motivation by the reward-and cost concept. The advantage of Roger's circumflex approach is that it does not rely on any hard categorization model, but can rather serve as a basis when defining attacker profiles that share similar characteristics. Hence, to comply with the model in [18] we suggest tuning, of both the rewardand cost values of the game elements as well as the attack intensities in the stochastic model, to model the motivation and skill of the particular kind of attackers that are considered in the system's threat environment. The effect of tuning the attack intensities is straightforward to explain; by rising the attack intensity values, the corresponding failure rates will increase. However, the influence of the outcome values in the game model is not as obvious. This section will therefore demonstrate the tuning of the game parameters.
A. Tuning the Game Parameters
The stochastic game model presented in the previous section is based on a reward-and cost concept. These values will represent the attackers' motivation when deciding on attack actions. Whenever an attacker performs an attack action, he immediately receives a reward. Furthermore, if the action succeeds, additional rewards may be gained. We use negative rewards, i.e. costs, to make room for the possibility that some attackers may be more risk averse than others. The cost of a detected action will be an important demotivation factor when modeling, for example, insiders; legitimate users who override their current privileges. Similarly, commercial adversaries would lose reputation and market share if it is exposed that illegal means are used.
Since we have chosen to model the interactions between an attacker and the system as a zero-sum game rather than a general-sum one, an increasing cost value will play a deterrent role for an attacker. However, due to the inherent properties of the minimax solution in (15) , also an increasing reward value will indirectly play a deterrent role for an attacker. One must therefore vary the cost parameters rather than the reward parameters in order to get an intuitive corresponding attack strategy. This process will be further illustrated in the upcoming examples.
In (13) we set r kl = 1 and p ij (a k , d l ) = 0, ∀j, k, l, and then let the cost value vary between −10 ≤ c kl ≤ 0. This provides us with the possibility of analyzing how the cost of a detected attack versus the reward of an undetected one will affect the expected attacker behavior for a particular system state i.
B. One Possible Attack Action
As a first example, assume that a system is vulnerable to a single attack action in state i. An attacker can choose either to perform the attack (action a), or to resign (action φ). The system's reponse actions are to either set an alarm (action d) or no reaction (action φ). Hence, A i = {a, φ} and D i = {φ, d}. To model this scenario we use the 2 × 2 game element
where the cost value b represents an attacker's cost of a detected action and c the cost of resigning, even though an attempted attack would have been undetected. By varying b and c we can now demonstrate how the relation γ ad /γ aφ (i.e. the cost of a detected attack versus the reward of an undetected attack) and γ φφ /γ aφ (i.e. the cost associated with resigning versus the reward of an undetected attack) will affect the attackers' expected behavior, in terms of the attack probability π * (15), as previously discussed. 4 depicts a more complete graph of risk averse attackers' expected behavior. In the graph we let −9 ≤ b, c ≤ 1. One can see that the expected probability of attacking is highest, π * i (a) = 1.0, when b = 1. This is intuitive since an attacker who receives the same reward whether he is detected or not will always choose to attack. On the other hand, the expected probability of attacking is lowest, π * i (a) = 0.0, when c > 0 and b < 0. This can be interpreted as if the reward of an attack is small enough, so that it is not significantly greater than the cost of resigning, an attacker may not even bother to try (of course this is an ideal situation unlikely to occur in real life). In general, as the examples indicate and the graph illustrates, as the cost values increase we can expect attackers to act more carefully.
It is interesting to note that even though measures are taken to increase the cost of detected actions, legal proceedings for instance, a rapidly decreasing b will only have marginal effect on the behavior of an attacker who has a strong reluctance of resigning. This is shown in the graph as a slowly decreasing π * i (a) along the "c = −9"-axis. In fact, the parameter that has the strongest influence on the expected attacker behavior w.r.t. (17) is c. Unfortunately, since c represents a mental factor in this game (the attackers' reluctance to resign) it will be difficult for a system administrator to take preventive measures influencing c in a way that will reduce π * i (a).
C. More Attack Actions
The same methodology can also be used to compute the expected attacker behavior for states where a system is vulnerable to a large number of attack actions. An (n+ 1) × (n + 1) game element (n possible attack actions) might look like
For example, if n = 4 and we choose the cost values as b1=−3, b2=−4, b3=−8, b4=−6 and c=−1,
, π * i (φ)) = (0.14, 0.12, 0.07, 0.08, 0.54). However, if b1 and b2 is increased to −4 and −8 respectively, then π * i = (0.13, 0.07, 0.07, 0.09, 0.64). One can see that also for larger games, an increasing cost of a detected action will lead to a smaller probability of an attacker choosing that particular action.
A more detailed look of how the expected attack probabilities depend on the cost values is depicted in Fig. 5-6 . In Fig. 5 one can see how a particular attack probability is affected when varying the different cost values. For example, the upper left graph indicates that π * i (a 1 ) is at its highest when b1 → 0. Fig. 6 depicts how the elements in the attack probability vector π * i depend on a particular cost value. For example, the lower right graph shows that π * i (φ) is high when b4 < −2 and that π * i (a 4 ) rises as b4 → 0. Note that a k ∈Ai π * i (a k ) = 1.
VI. CASE STUDY: THE DNS SERVICE
To further illustrate the approach, we model and analyze the security and dependability of a DNS service. The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a critical service to the Internet -the mapping between names and addresses. The most important attributes of this service are availability and integrity; the service should be there when the clients need it, and it must provide correct replies to DNS request. We distinguish between two different types of accidental failure modes; hardware availability failures (AH), which require a manual repair, and software availability failures (AS), which only require a system reconfiguration and/or reboot. Unfortunately, buffer overflow vulnerabilities are common in multiple implementations of DNS resolver libraries. During its operational lifetime, the server will be subject to manual maintenance, upgrades and reconfigurations. Humans frequently make mistakes. It is therefore realistic to assume that the system will naturally alternate between a good state (G) where it is secure against these types of attacks and another good, but vulnerable, state (V ) where buffer overflow attacks are possible. When the system is in the vulnerable state, an attacker who can send malicious DNS requests might exploit such a vulnerability to gain access to the server. This may transfer the system into a third state (L), from where it is possible to insert false entries in the server cache; software integrity failure (IS), or to shut the server down; software availability failure (AS). In this case, all the three states G, V and L are considered to be good states. Even though the system is erroneous in states V and L, it still manages to deliver the intended service, i.e. to provide clients with correct replies to DNS requests. Hence, the system state set is S = {G, V, L, IS, AS, AH}, whereof S G = {G, V, L} and S F = {IS, AS, AH}.
The state transition model in Fig. 2 in Section IV depicts the security and dependability behavior of a single DNS server under the given assumptions. The transitions labeled with the µ S and µ H rates represent the accidental software-and hardware failures, the ϕ rates represent the system administrator's possible actions and the λ rates represent the intensities of the possible attack actions. The game elements are the shaded states in the figure: Γ = {Γ V , Γ L , Γ IS }. The attack action set in the stochastic game is A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , φ} = {"illegal login", "cache poisoning", "server shut down", "do nothing"} and the defense action set is the corresponding
, µ H = 1/3600 and µ S = 1/120 (per hour) the game elements become
By using Alg. 1, the stochastic game can be solved. The optimal attack strategy vectors π * = {π * V , π * L , π * IS } will then be used in the state transition rate matrix for the DNS server when predicting system measures. The rate matrix Q is displayed in Table I . To illustrate the effect of the reward and cost values on the predicted system measures, we perform the computations for four different scenarios. Note that all numerical values (reward-and costs as well as failure rates) are chosen for illustration purposes only.
A. Case 1: The Worst-case Scenario
First we look at the "worst-case" scenario when all attackers always try all possible attacks, i.e. π i (a k ) = 1, ∀i, k in Q. In this case we do not use the game model to compute the expected attacker behavior. Using (5) and (6) in Section III we compute the steady state probabilities for the DNS server as (9) and (10) we obtain the mean time to first failure M T F F = 97.11 (h) and the mean time to failure M T T F = 96.62 (h) for the DNS server.
B. Case 2: Risk Averse Attackers
Now assume that the attackers will take into account the possible consequences of their actions. We use the set of reward-and cost values r a1,φ =r a2,φ =r a3,φ =1, c a1,d1 =−4, c a2,d2 =−3, c a3,d3 =−2, c φ,φ =−5. Solving the stochastic game in accordance to Alg. 1 provides the optimal attack strategy vectors π .61 (h) and M T T F = 100.97 (h). Since this scenario assumes risk averse attackers, both the M T F F and M T T F will be slightly higher than in the worst-case scenario.
C. Case 3: Implementing Countermeasures
Assume that we want to evaluate the benefit of setting up a new logging and tracing mechanism for the DNS server, with the purpose of reducing the probability of illegal login attempts (action a 1 ). As in the previous scenario we consider risk averse attackers. All detected illegal login attempts will be recorded and prosecuted, which are modeled as an increasing cost value c a1,d1 = −7 in game element Γ V . Hence, the new expected attack strategy for state V will be π * V = (0.394, 0.606). The corresponding measures are X = {0.976, 1.37·10 −2 , 6.25· 10 −4 , 0, 3.14 · 10 −3 , 6.62 · 10 −3 }, M T F F = 102.11 (h) and M T T F = 101.26 (h). The results show that even though π * V (a 1 ) is decreased with 23%, the M T F F and M T T F are only marginally increased. As a conclusion, the DNS service will not benefit much from the new logging and tracing mechanism.
D. Case 4: Accidental Failures Only
Finally assume that we do not consider attacks at all, but rather model accidental failure only, i.e. π i (a k ) = 0, ∀i, k in Q. The corresponding measures are X = {0.882, 0.108, 0, 0, 2.75 · 10 −3 , 6.62 · 10 −3 } and M T F F = M T T F = 116.13 (h). As can be seen, the system's expected time to failure will increase noticeably when attacks are not included as possible fault sources. Hence, for the actual parametrization the random failures will dominate the trustworthiness of the service.
A comparison of the M T T F for the four cases are provided in Fig. 7 . It should be noted that since the rate values in this example are chosen for illustration purposes only, the predicted system measures may not conform with failure times for a real-life server implementation.
VII. RELATED WORK a) Security and dependability: In [2] , Laprie et.al. provide a taxonomy for dependability and security, and a thorough definition of its concepts. A deliverable produced by the MAFTIA project [4] refines these concepts in the context of malicious faults and discusses how fault prevention, removal, tolerance and forecasting can be re-interpreted in a security context. Jonson et.al. [19] suggest a unified framework for integrated security and dependability assessment. The objective is to create a basis for system failure analysis, regardless if the failure is caused by an intrusion or a hardware fault. Nicol et.al. [6] provide a survey over existing dependability analysis techniques and summarizes how these are being extended to evaluate security. The terminology and concepts in this paper are built on these papers.
b) Stochastic models of security: Ortalo et.al.
[20] present a quantitative model to measure known Unix security vulnerabilities using a privilege graph, which is transformed into a Markov chain. The model allows for the characterization of operational security expressed as the mean effort to security failure, as originally proposed by Littlewood et.al. in [21] . Further, Madan et. al. [22] use traditional stochastic modeling techniques to capture attacker behavior and the system's response to attacks and intrusions. A quantitative security analysis is carried out for the steady state behavior of the system. In [23] Stevens et. al. describe an approach for probabilistic validation of an intrusion-tolerant replication system. They provide a hierarchical model using stochastic activity nets (SAN), which can be used to validate intrusion tolerant systems and to evaluate merits of various design choices. Our modeling approach is inspired by all these paper, especially [22] . The main difference is the use of attack probabilities to integrate attacker behavior in the transition rates of our model. Moreover, we model accidental hardware and software failures, alongside with intrusions.
c) Game Theory: Game theory in a security related context has also been utilized in previous papers. Lye and Wing [13] use a game theoretic method to analyze the security of computer networks. The interactions between an attacker and the administrator are modeled as a two-player general-sum stochastic game for which optimal strategies (Nash Equilibrium) are computed. In [15] a preliminary framework for modeling attacker intent, objectives and strategies (AIOS) is presented. To infer AIOS a game theoretic approach is used and models for different threat environments are suggested. The game theoretic method used in this paper is heavily influenced by these models. However, in contrast to [13] , we model the outcome of the game elements as the possible consequences of the attackers' actions being detected or not by the system's IDS mechanisms, and in contrast to [15] we use the same game model for different threat environments. This paper is based on the results previously published in [24] . This extended version contains expansions of key ideas, discussions, examples, elaborations and applications.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a stochastic model for integrated security and dependability evaluation. Our modeling approach aim to consider most aspects that will affect the trustworthiness of a system, such as normal user behavior, administrative activities, random software-and hardware failures, and intentional attacks. By using stochastic game theory we can compute the expected attacker behavior for different types of attackers. The reward-and cost concept makes it possible to use the stochastic model to predict security-and dependability measures for a particular threat environment. Having solved the game, the expected attacker behavior is reflected in the transitions between states in the system model, by weighting the transition rates according to probability distributions. In the final step, the corresponding stochastic process is used to compute operational measures of the system.
The game theoretic approach deserves a few more comments. The optimal strategies have frequently been used to derive predictions of what players in a game will do [25] . As pointed out in Section IV, π * will be an indication of the best strategy for attackers who do not know the probabilities that their actions will be detected. If the detection probabilities are known, maximizing (14) will be straightforward, hence, (15) is not applicable. Moreover, the approach is based on the underlying assumption that the attackers have a complete overview of the system states, the possible transitions between states and the existing vulnerabilities. This may not always be the case in real life. Other types of models, e.g. games with incomplete information, may therefore be more appropriate in some cases. Finally we would like to point out that modeling the attackers' interactions with the system as a zero-sum stochastic game will always provide us with a single unique solution to the game.
As indicated in the case study, there are additional features of our model than just probabilistic predictions of a system. For instance, system administrators can use our approach to answer questions such as "What is the effect of hardening security?" and "Should we perform additional monitoring?". The effect of these two countermeasures can be evaluated in our modeling and analysis framework before implementation, by changing the corresponding transition rates in the model and then comparing the results. Currently, our model is being integrated into a framework for dynamic security and dependability assessment. The framework is based on a method for real-time risk assessment using a distributed networked agent-sensor architecture, published in [26] . By using live data from network sensors, the current state and the future behavior of the system can be predicted, which makes it possible to compute system security and dependability measures, in real time.
In the future we plan to verify the model's ability to predict real-life attacks. This will require further research, including validation of the model against empirical data.
